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Entrepreneurial Choice:
Restoring a Relevant Antitrust
Policy
Warren Grimes†
Abstract
Current antitrust orthodoxy focuses on short-term price/output
factors. This increasingly criticized model does not adequately protect
competition in industries in which individuals and small firms thrive.
Small entrepreneurs may be efficient for a variety of reasons, including
the incentives that flow from owner operation, the personal relationships that lead to superior service, or the strong creative component of
the business. Despite advantages in efficiencies and superior willingness
to innovate, small providers have been forced out of the market by
intended or unintended effects of antitrust enforcement decisions and
regulatory initiatives. This Article explores the concept of entrepreneurial choice and its application to small entrepreneurs. Recognizing
the metric of entrepreneurial choice, along with consumer choice, is
critical to protecting competition and restoring antitrust relevancy. To
address these issues, the Article examines shortcomings in enforcement
and regulatory policies in three critical industries—agriculture,
healthcare, and communications and entertainment—and compares
these industries to the wine and beer industries, where creative small
entrepreneurs have a revitalized presence. This Article concludes by
offering an approach for protecting efficient and in-demand small entrepreneurs while enhancing life choices for consumer and seller alike. In
industries in which small entrepreneurs are efficient, this formula
includes enhanced merger control, more vigorous antitrust enforcement
to maintain open distribution, and greater tolerance for small seller collective actions needed to offset monopsony power.
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Introduction
Current antitrust orthodoxy focuses on short-term price and output
factors in determining what constitutes an antitrust violation.1 Under
this approach, mergers to tight oligopoly or oligopsony have been
permitted and little attention has been paid to distribution restraints
that stifle entry. Enforcement policies, it turns out, are particularly
suspect when it comes to protecting individuals and small firms that
efficiently perform in industries suited to small entrepreneurship. A
focus on entrepreneurial choice—the flip side of protecting consumer
1.

For criticism of this approach, see generally How the Chicago School
Overshot the Mark: The Effect of Conservative Economic
Analysis on U.S. Antitrust (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) (examining
predominant interpretations of conservative economic theory); Jonathan Baker,
Taking the Error Out of “Error Cost” Analysis: What’s Wrong with Antitrust’s
Right, 80 Antitrust L.J. 1, 7 (2015) (arguing that the application of the
“error cost” framework relies on erroneous economic assumptions and yields “a
non-interventionist bias” to any conclusions); Stacy Mitchell, View from the
Shop—Antitrust and the Decline of America’s Small Businesses, 61 Antitrust
Bull. 498, 502 (2016) (explaining how orthodox antitrust policy has undermined
creative and innovative small businesses’ ability to flourish and compete against
larger firms); Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 Yale L.
J. 710, 717–46 (2017) (offering an extensive critique of the price/output model
as background for assessment of Amazon). See also Einer Elhauge, Horizontal
Shareholding, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1267, 1271–72 (2016) (explaining how
institutional shareholders with substantial holdings in major rival firms in an
industry reduce competition in oligopolistic industries and how this
development may be linked to increasing concentration of wealth in fewer
hands).
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choice—starkly highlights the shortcomings of a focus on price and
output.
This Article examines how greater sensitivity to protection of the
efficient individual entrepreneur or small firm—one that offers products
and services in demand—can enhance efficiencies, promote innovation,
provide needed guidance for regulatory initiatives, and increase the
quality of life for both consumers and those who provide critical products and services. This approach has the added benefit of enhancing
democratic values through dispersed economic power.
After first describing the concept of entrepreneurial choice in Part
I, Part II focuses on the efficiencies and other advantages that explain
the resilience of small firms and solo-practicing service providers. Part
III examines some of the perverse effects of antitrust and regulation in
three key industries: agriculture, healthcare, and telecommunications
and entertainment. By way of contrast, Part IV examines why small
providers have mounted a comeback in the beer and wine industries.
This Article concludes that consumer and entrepreneurial choice should
be given greater weight in setting antitrust and regulatory policies, particularly for industries suited for small entrepreneurs. Part V provides
suggestions on how this might be done.

I. Entrepreneurial Choice
How do you buy what you eat? Do you shop primarily in
supermarkets that are part of large regional or national chains? Would
you prefer to have the choice of also buying from local farmers, whose
products might be more expensive, but who offer enhanced freshness
and genuine organic options?
How do you get your healthcare? Do you rely on an HMO or an
insurance-company controlled medical plan that excludes some physicians from the network? Would you prefer to deal with a solopracticing or small-practice physician whom you trust and who has
longstanding ties to your family?
What are your choices for home video entertainment? Do you rely
on traditional cable programming supplied by large vertically integrated firms that control both distribution and content? Do you prefer
the more open-ended options provided by the internet?
Answers to these questions will vary. Most of us, however, value
choices and the opportunity to change our mind. Recognition that
meaningful choices are a vital part of competition is hardly novel. In
1776, Adam Smith wrote that “the private interests and passions of
men” lead them to allocate resources “as nearly as possible in the proportion which is most agreeable to the interest of the whole society.”2
2.

Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations 594–95 (Edwin Cannan ed., Mod. Lib. Ed. 1937) (1776).
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In focusing on how naturally occurring competition controlled
allocation, Smith was cognizant of the preferences “of the whole
society.”3 Both consumer and entrepreneurial choice were implicit in his
approach. By 1890, the Sherman Act’s proponents were not in the least
reticent about their goal of protecting the small entrepreneur, particularly small farmers and ranchers—a theme that continues to be echoed
in modern treatises.4
The antitrust approach to large firms has long focused on balancing
their potential efficiencies against the risk of oligopolistic conduct—
conduct that can directly affect downstream buyers and consumers. The
oligopsony risks associated with large firms have received less attention.
In 1966, Donald Turner, then Assistant Attorney General, addressed
the issues raised by concentrated industries and focused on seller power
and pricing.5 Turner did not mention buyer-power risks. Half a century
later, although the literature has expanded our understanding of buyerpower abuses,6 the Turner observations still reflect a mainstream antitrust focus on seller power.

In an earlier sentence in the same paragraph, Smith’s focus on the well-being of
society as a whole is also evident: “[T]he private interests and passions of
individuals naturally dispose them to turn their stock towards the employments
which in ordinary cases are most advantageous to the society.” Id. at 594.
3.

Id. at 595.

4.

See infra notes 37–43 and accompanying text (discussing the goals of the
Sherman Act proponents). In their venerable treatise, Scherer and Ross describe
the value of entrepreneurial choice: “A . . . political merit of a competitive
market is its freedom of opportunity. . . . Individuals are free to choose whatever
trade or profession they prefer, limited only by their own talent and skill and
by their ability to raise the (presumably modest) amount of capital required.”
F.M. Scherer & David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and
Economic Performance 19 (3d ed. 1990).

5.

An Interview with the Honorable Donald F. Turner, Assistant Attorney General
in Charge of the Antitrust Division, 30 Antitrust L.J. 100, 103–04 (1966)
(“[N]on-competitive pricing and other non-competitive behavior in oligopoly
industries is a matter of serious concern, as indeed it has been for a long time.”).
It is possible that Turner used the words monopoly and oligopoly to cover both
seller- and buyer-power issues, but such usage would also suggest the lack of
focus on buyer-power issues.

6.

See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Monopsony:
Antitrust Law and Economics (1993); Clayton J. Masterman, Note, The
Customer Is Not Always Right: Balancing Worker and Customer Welfare in
Antitrust Law, 69 Vand. L. Rev. 1387, 1413 (2016); John B. Kirkwood, Powerful
Buyers and Merger Enforcement, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 1485, 1491–92 (2012); Peter
C. Carstensen, Buying Power, Competition Policy, and Antitrust: The Competitive
Effects of Discrimination Among Suppliers, 53 Antitrust Bull. 271, 276 (2008);
Warren S. Grimes, Buyer Power and Retail Gatekeeper Power: Protecting
Competition and the Atomistic Seller, 72 Antitrust L.J. 563, 563 (2005).
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On the demand side, the Supreme Court has recognized that one of
the goals of competition law is the protection of consumer choice.7
Antitrust theorists have provided rich supportive commentary that describes the benefits of sensitivity to consumer choice issues.8 Protecting
the choices and opportunities of a vulnerable atomistic seller would
seem a natural corollary when the power lies not with the large seller
but with large buyers who can coerce the small seller.
The connection between consumer choice and entrepreneurial
choice is direct. If small firms that offer services and products consumers
want are driven from the marketplace, consumer choice is undercut.
When a relatively small craft brewer sells a popular product, but cannot
survive because of lax antitrust enforcement or misguided regulatory
policy, the loss in choice falls not only on the would-be craft brewer,
but also on the consumer. Meaningful consumer choice exists when
market structure allows for new entry and sustainability for small firms
that offer what consumers want. Maintaining entrepreneurial choice is
also linked to dynamic efficiency. A small firm with a novel idea appealing to consumers can have a difficult time sustaining its entry if large
existing competitors can engage in exclusionary conduct. Innovation
can be delayed or suppressed.9
The protection of entrepreneurial choice should not be a ticket for
favored treatment of small firms. What should be protected is a right
to compete on the merits, unhindered by exclusionary or abusive conduct by large firms and as free as possible of government regulation
that discriminates against the small provider.

7.

See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) (“[T]he
assumption that competition is the best method of allocating resources in a free
market recognizes that all elements of a bargain—quality, service, safety, and
durability—and not just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free
opportunity to select among alternative offers.”) (emphasis added). See also FTC
v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (“[A]n agreement limiting
consumer choice by impeding the ‘ordinary give and take of the market
place,’ . . . cannot be sustained under the Rule of Reason.”) (quoting Nat’l Soc’y
of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 692); United States v. Cont’l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441,
453–56 (1964) (discussing the role played by price differences and buyer
preferences in influencing consumer choice and creating competition).

8.

Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, 62 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 503, 504–05 (2001); John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The
Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing
Efficiency, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 191, 192 (2008).

9.

See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 301–03 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980) (addressing conspiracy to delay
introduction of a new electronic flash device developed by General Electric);
Mitchell, supra note 1, at 508 (canvassing evidence that small businesses are
superior innovators).
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Properly viewed, the connection between competition law and
government regulation is straightforward. If competition law is effective
in preserving competition, the need for government regulation should
be minimized.10 Where regulation is needed—as it may be for health
and safety reasons—the regulation ought to show the same sensitivity
for survival of small firms that antitrust policy should show.
Regulations that are designed for, and sometimes at the behest of, large
firms can and often do undermine entry, competition, and entrepre–
neurial choice.

II. When Small Can Be Superior to Big
Today, Americans are accustomed to big corporations that provide
sophisticated or high-tech products our predecessors could only imagine. Airplanes, automobiles, sophisticated drugs, computers, and other
digital products are examples. Many every-day consumables, including
processed food, cigarettes, toothpaste, and laundry detergent are the
products of very large firms. Critical sectors of retailing are now
dominated by large chains.
Despite the prominence of large firms and downturns in the number
of newly created and surviving small businesses,11 a great deal of what
is bought and sold in the marketplace continues to flow through
individuals or relatively small businesses. That was true in 1890 and
remains true today. According to Census data, 78.5 percent of all firms
with paid employees had fewer than ten employees.12 The largest
number of employer firms operate in professional, scientific and technical services, retail trade, construction, and health care and social
assistance.13 Small firms and atomistic providers still have a major
presence in most service professions, in providing food and drink, in the
arts, and in other creative professions. For example, there is high concentration among firms that provide auditing services for large business
entities, but there remain hundreds of smaller or solo-practicing
10.

See, e.g., Scherer & Ross, supra note 4, at 18 (“The resource allocation and
income distribution problem is solved through the . . . forces on the market,
and not through the conscious exercise of power held in government hands (that
is, under state enterprise or government regulation).”).

11.

Mitchell, supra note 1, at 502 (citing evidence of the decline in numbers and
market share of small businesses in manufacturing and retailing).

12.

Nearly 1 in 10 Businesses with Employees Are New, According to Inaugural
Annual Survey of Entrepreneurs, Commerce.gov (Sept. 1, 2016, 12:08 PM),
https://www.commerce.gov/news/blog/2016/09/nearly-1-10-businessesemployees-are-new-according-inaugural-annual-survey [https://perma.cc/4
V6P-JGNC].

13.

Id.

66

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 1·2017
Restoring a Relevant Antitrust Policy

accountants that ply their trade for small firms or individuals.14 In the
healthcare industry, HMOs and large group practices are increasingly
common, but solo and small-practice physicians remain very much in
demand. And, while we shop for consumables at giant supermarket
chains or big box retailers, Americans have not lost interest in buying
from local farmers’ markets, in drinking the products of local or regional
craft brewers or winemakers, or in dining at locally owned eateries.
Consumer dissatisfaction is often high when we are forced to deal with
large service providers, particularly when choice is limited as with large
cable television and telecom providers.
There are obvious issues involving small businesses. Many are short
lived. According to a 2016 Census release, over 481,000 firms with paid
employees, or 8.9 percent of the total, had been in business for less than
two years while only 3.1 percent of firms have been in business for
sixteen or more years.15 Many small firms struggle on subsistence earnings. Two percent of employer firms had annual receipts of less than
$10,000; only 25.8 percent of employer firms had receipts of $1 million
or more.16 Small businesses also probably make up a large share of
businesses involved in deceptive or fraudulent conduct, or operating
outside the regulatory framework.
Despite these issues, small business remains resilient and, in many
sectors, the preferred way of doing business. Small enterprises thrive in
industries that typically fit in one or more of the following categories:
(1) owner-operated businesses that can operate efficiently on a small
scale; (2) professionals or other service providers; (3) artists, writers, or
athletes whose success is determined by individual initiative and creativity; and (4) producers who sell customized products or who otherwise
require a high degree of personal contact with customers or suppliers.
There are obvious explanations for why many industries have
remained fertile ground for small business. The first is that these
industries may operate more efficiently, flexibly, innovatively, and responsively to local demand when left in the hands of individuals or
small firms. The second is that, regardless of economic advantage, both
the providers and the customers may prefer the personal contact
characteristic of small business.

14.

Jessica Fritz, Who Audits Public Companies—2016 Edition, AuditAnalytics
(June 7, 2016), http://www.auditanalytics.com/blog/who-audits-publiccompanies-2016-edition/ [https://perma.cc/LH9W-KUM6] (noting that for
smaller companies publicly reporting, none of the Big Four accounting firms
have a substantial market share).

15.

Nearly 1 in 10 Businesses with Employees Are New, According to Inaugural
Annual Survey of Entrepreneurs, supra note 12.

16.

Id.
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A. The Efficiencies of Small Businesses

A primary efficiency harnessed by a franchise system is the
individual franchisee’s entrepreneurial energy—a quality that may be
lacking when individual retail outlets are owned by a large firm.17
Salaried store managers may lack the same incentive to work the extra
hours that a franchise owner possesses.18 The franchise owner may also
have substantial authority and flexibility to address day-to-day problems in the outlet’s operation.
What is true for franchising will hold with greater force for an
owner-operated small business. As compared to a franchisee, the owneroperator has more flexibility to change inventory, location, selling
methods, hours of operation, etc. The owner-operator also avoids the
incentive for disloyal agency that can be a problem when a firm gives
responsibility for purchasing to managers. Using the firm’s money to
purchase services or inventory, there is a risk that the manager, in
breach of her fiduciary duty, will favor a non-competitive supplier because of an under-the-table payment, a family tie, or other personal
relationships.19 An owner-operator can enter into disadvantageous commercial relationships only at her own cost.
Big businesses can have economies of scale and scope that small
firms lack. A large producer can streamline production and marketing
in ways that a smaller rival cannot. For many types of manufacturing,
processing, and distribution, the advantages of scale can be substantial.20 In addition, economies of scope are enjoyed by multi-product
firms such as Proctor & Gamble. Its diverse offerings of consumer
products give it a deep pool of resources, an ability to jointly promote
and distribute multiple products, and insulation against failure if one
17.

See Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise
Contract, 21 J. L. & Econ. 223, 226–29 (1978) (discussing how incentives
promote franchisee efficiency). See also Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft, The
Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, 28 J. L. & Econ. 345, 350
n. 20 (1985) (“[T]he incentive for workers to supply effort that is not explicitly
specified and measurable by the employer . . . is harvested by franchising
managements.”).

18.

Large firms that hire local managers can lessen but not eliminate this incentive
problem by paying the manager a percentage of profits generated by the
managed outlet.

19.

See, e.g., Rash v. J.V. Intermediate, Ltd., 498 F. 3d 1201, 1210 (10th Cir. 2007)
(finding local manager of national enterprise breached his fiduciary duty by
favoring his own scaffolding firm over that owned by the enterprise).

20.

Achieving scale efficiencies may require large firms, but often not to the point
of dominance or oligopoly. See Joe S. Bain, Advantages of the Large Firm:
Production, Distribution, and Sales Promotion, 20 J. Marketing 336, 345–
46 (1956) (finding that in many industries achieving minimum efficient scale
did not require a highly concentrated industry structure).
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of its lines should flounder. Not all efficiency advantages, however, favor
the large firm.
A prominent business theorist wrote that large companies “make
fewer but bigger errors, tend to continue wrong policies too long, and
have the resources to delay until crisis is unmistakable.”21 Another
observed that “[a] big organization is bureaucratic, harder to inspire
and energize, and much less likely to respond to the energies of a few
creative people.”22 As a firm becomes larger, its bureaucratic structure
makes it more difficult to trace costs and benefits of creative conduct
within the organization.23 There is strong anecdotal evidence to support
the view that large firms are more subject to the momentum of the
status quo and less willing to experiment and innovate. A petroleum
industry expert, focusing on the waste and pollution caused when methane or natural gas is burned at a drilling source rather than captured
and distributed, suggested that innovation addressing this problem is
likely to come from small firms, not giant firms that tend to be cautious
about change.24 The giant Bell Corporation, a dominant firm in offering
telephone service throughout most of the twentieth century, did not
introduce automatic switching machines until well after a number of

21.

Corporate Takeovers (Part I): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms.,
Consumer Prot. and Fin. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 259 (1985) (testimony of Warren A. Law, Edmund Cogswell
Converse Professor of Finance, Harvard Business School). Professor Law
continued: “Corporate history is replete with examples. In the absence of
compelling technical advantages of large size, there is ground to prefer small
productive units to large.” Id.

22.

Alonzo L. McDonald, Of Floating Factories and Mating Dinosaurs, 64 Harv.
Bus. Rev. 82, 83 (1986).

23.

M. S. Moyer, The Roots of Large Scale Retailing, J. Marketing, Oct. 1962,
at 55, 57 (“In the large organization, responsibility for the attainment of profit
objectives must be apportioned and reapportioned many times. . . . Costs tend
to become nontraceable.”).

24.

Oil Innovators See Opportunity Amid Record Low Prices, PBS Newshour
(Aug. 25, 2015, 6:20 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/oil-innovatorssee-opportunity-amid-record-low-prices
[https://perma.cc/2WDH-7ZLJ].
The segment described the wasted natural gas that escapes during drilling,
typically polluting when burned at the site, and quoted industry expert Carl
Larry:
We need a Steve Jobs in oil and gas. We need somebody who is going
to go out there and take a chance. Big companies aren’t. They’re just
going to keep their budgets going doing what they do right now and
making money. But the ones who take the chances are the small
businesses, the people who have the guts to take it out and try
something new.
Id.
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smaller telephone companies had adopted this innovation.25 Recent
empirical evidence supports anecdotal accounts that small firms are
often a superior engine for innovation.26
Those economies that favor large size are, in any event, likely far
more limited in the service professions, in businesses that involve
extensive service for the customer, or creative component industries. In
any industry in which there is a strong service component, economies
of scale are achieved at lower size levels and there is heightened need
for close and nurtured relationships between buyer and seller.27 One
management expert estimates that the optimum size of a professional
service organization “is probably between 35 and 100 people.”28 Not
only do economies of scale end as firm size increases—large agglomerations of service providers are likely to incur diseconomies.29 One
example is a large law firm. The firm’s size has some advantages, such
as its ability to refer clients to specialists within the firm. But there are
large firm inefficiencies, such as added supervisory costs, resolving profit
and benefit allocations among participants, and resolving potential
conflicts of interest among its many clients.30
The banking industry provides an example of the relevance of size
in a service-oriented industry. Large banks have the resources and
expertise to make substantial loans to multinational businesses,
sometimes by forming consortia involving other large lending institutions. A community bank would not be suited to this task. However,
when it comes to the banking services that a small business or a
25.

Sheldon Hochheiser, Electromechanical Telephone-Switching, Engineering &
Tech. Hist. Wiki, http://ethw.org/Electromechanical_Telephone-Switching
[https://perma.cc/ZRC8-CMF2] (last updated Jan. 9, 2015, 5:22 PM) (stating
that AT&T Bell had automatic switching technology as early as 1903, but
resisted adopting the systems).

26.

See Mitchell, supra note 1, at 508 (citing Wilfred Dolfsma & Gerben van der
Velde, Industry Innovativeness, Firm Size, and Entrepreneurship: Schumpeter
Mark III?, 24 J. Evolutionary Econ. 713, 728 (2014)) (noting research
finding that industries populated with small businesses generate new products
and services at a faster rate than oligopoly dominated industries).

27.

See Michael D. Johnson & Fred Selnes, Customer Portfolio Management:
Toward a Dynamic Theory of Exchange Relationships, J. Marketing, Apr.
2004, at 1, 15 (“[T]he more a firm is positioned toward product offerings with
low economies of scale (i.e., high personal-service component), the stronger it
must be in developing and keeping closer relationships.”).

28.

McDonald, supra note 22, at 83 (“When you have more than 100 professionals
under one roof, extra layers of supervision are common, indeed inescapable, and
the organization becomes overregimented.”).

29.

Id.

30.

See id. (“Each layer [of supervision] adds expense, but not necessarily benefit
to the client.”).
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consumer needs, community banks perform very well, often better than
their larger rivals.31 A prominent former IMF economist estimated that
the most efficient size of a bank is under $10 billion in assets.32 Perhaps
because of fewer levels of bureaucratic overlay, small banks—when
compared to their largest competitors—provide banking services at
lower charges, lend more to small businesses, and have lower default
rates.33 These findings are hardly surprising. Banking is a serviceintensive industry where personal relationships matter and where
knowledge of local conditions can be critical. As with other service
oriented industries examined here, maintaining the rules of competition
so that small banks may enter and survive serves both efficiency and
quality of life goals.
B. Creativity

The notion that a Beethoven Symphony could not have been
written by committee is relevant in many areas of the creative arts.
Successful writers may have contracts with publishers. Producers, directors, and screen writers in entertainment are often employed by the
major studios. But a beautiful painting, a soaring musical work, and a
good book are typically the work of a single individual, who then may
sell it to a firm for production or publication. Lennon and McCartney,
while collaborating on memorable tracks, did not take orders from a
corporate superior. Screen plays may be collaborations, some of them
under a large corporate umbrella. Still, creation of film and video programs remains a creative occupation with many individuals and small
firms pressing to offer new content.34
Individual efforts are also at the core of those who present and
entertain, including actors, musicians, and athletes. Creative individuals could well be stifled or repressed if they are subject to the
regimen of a large firm. The inherent advantages of individual performance in the creative world is demonstrated when, even among nations
that have experimented with centrally planned economies, creators and
performers have maintained a high degree of independence.
31.

See Mitchell, supra note 1, at 505–06 (noting that community banks charge
lower fees, have lower default rates on loans, and lend a greater proportion of
money to small businesses).

32.

Implications of the “Volcker Rules” for Financial Stability: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 47 (2010)
(statement of Simon Johnson, Ronald A. Kurtz Professor of Entrepreneurship,
Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology).

33.

Mitchell, supra note 1, at 505–06.

34.

The number of independent artists, writers, and performers is estimated to be
over 765,000. Roland J. Kushner & Randy Cohen, National Arts
Index 2016: An Annual Measure of the Vitality of Arts and
Culture in the United States: 2002–2013 39 (2016).
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C. Lifestyle Preferences for Entrepreneurial Independence

Another reason for the resilience of small or individually owned
firms is that both the suppliers and customers prefer to do business this
way. Simply put, for most people, “the smaller the work unit, the
greater the satisfaction.”35 Efficient or not, many service providers,
small retailers, farmers, and fishermen want to own and manage their
own business. Collectively, small retailers offer a rich variety of choices
that consumers continue to patronize—the best indication that this
distribution method is attractive to both buyers and sellers. Most small
restaurants are not highly profitable and may struggle to survive. They
are nonetheless able to maintain a loyal customer base, capture entrepreneurial incentives from the owner, and become a vital part of the
local economy. People in the creative arts often work for the love of
their craft. J.K. Rowling notwithstanding, many writers and actors
struggle to survive in a line of work about which they are passionate.36
This preference for independence can of course be linked to
efficiencies. An owner who is sweeping the floor of a small retail business
may do so more willingly and with more enthusiasm than an employee
would. There is, however, value in the non-efficiency related level of
satisfaction that the owner manager enjoys. To ignore this value is to
move antitrust policy toward an impersonal and Orwellian world difficult to reconcile with Sherman Act values.

III. Antitrust and Regulatory Failures in Three
Critical Industries
The lives of both consumers and industry participants are adversely
affected when antitrust and regulatory policy do not adequately protect
entrepreneurial choice. Antitrust failures include tepid merger enforcement that has allowed large buyers to merge to tight oligopsony. When
these oligopsonists employ exclusionary purchasing tactics that harm
individual or small-firm sellers, orthodox antitrust policy and Supreme
Court procedural decisions have often denied small sellers an antitrust
remedy. Finally, when vulnerable individuals or small firms engage in
collective action to counter oligopsony power, they can themselves become targets of antitrust enforcement directed at collective action.
Three critical industries examined below illustrate these points.

35.

McDonald, supra note 22, at 83.

36.

See Kushner & Kohen, supra note 34, at 39 (“Many independent artists ply
their cultural trade on a part-time basis, combining arts entrepreneurship with
other jobs and work.”).
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A. Agriculture

In 1890, and for at least the three decades that followed, agriculture
and the Sherman Act were joined at the hip. Rural Americans were a
key constituency pressing for antitrust legislation—support that was
illustrated by the frequent references to agriculture in congressional debates.37 Key targets were processors and the rail industry that transported goods to processors.38 What followed were key enforcement
initiatives directed at railroads,39 meat packing,40 tobacco,41 and oil.42
The Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 further buttressed the enforcement framework intended to protect competition considered vital for
farmers and ranchers.43
By the mid-twentieth century, agriculture was no longer the focus
of antitrust enforcement. Even private enforcement actions that might
have aided small farmers fell on hard times44 as the Supreme Court
stiffened procedural and substantive requirements. In Cargill, Inc. v.
Monfort of Colorado, Inc.,45 the Court did not address buyer-power
issues and followed simplistic Chicago School logic in reversing a lower
court decision that would have thwarted further consolidation of the
beef packing industry.46
Levels of concentration tolerated in seller-power industries are
anathema when the same firms exercise buyer power over vulnerable,
atomistic sellers. Plant and animal products that spoil or become less
37.

21 Cong. Rec. 2,470–71 (1890) (statement of Sen. Allison) (citing concerns
from his farmer constituents about trusts in Chicago suppressing the price of
cattle); see also Hans B. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy:
Origination of an American Tradition 143 (1955) (discussing farm
organizations’ political involvement).

38.

Thorelli, supra note 37, at 58–60.

39.

N. Secs. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).

40.

Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905).

41.

United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).

42.

Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1910). Standard Oil was
accused in part of facilitating railroad cartels. Id. at 32–33.

43.

Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-51, 42 Stat. 159 (codified
as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 181–229 (2012)).

44.

Private plaintiffs had a notable mid-twentieth century success in Mandeville
Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948) (forbidding
sugar refiners’ conspiracy to suppress the price paid for sugar beets).

45.

479 U.S. 104 (1986).

46.

Id. at 119. See Jon Lauck, Toward an Agrarian Antitrust: A New Direction for
Agricultural Law, 75 N.D. L. Rev. 449, 503–04 (1999) (criticizing Cargill and
other merger cases that failed to address supplier issues and noting that buyerpower issues were not squarely addressed in the Cargill briefs).
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valuable after a prime selling time increase the vulnerability of a small
seller to a powerful buyer.47 Geographic limits on buyer markets are a
critical issue for farmers and ranchers. That meat processing plants may
be relatively unconcentrated in national terms is irrelevant to a rancher
who must find a buyer quickly and, because of substantial transportation costs, in a relatively limited geographic area. The farmer’s
vulnerability to powerful buyers is borne out by a model that showed
prices received by a hog farmer dropped in direct correlation to the
degree of concentration among meat packers.48 Today, meat processing
is highly concentrated nationally, and even more so when one considers
the limited geographic market available for those selling livestock.49
Choice of product is also an issue. Many consumers prefer to eat
beef from cattle raised on a natural grass-fed diet.50 The market,
however, can be distorted by the power of oligopolistic processors. In
the United States, industrial ranching practices call for cattle, around
one year of age, to be removed from pastures where they consumed a
biologically suited grass diet.51 They are then stacked into two story
trucks and transported for up to twenty hours with no food or drink to
crowded feedlots that contain up to 18,000 cattle.52 From this point on,
the animals can no longer graze, but are fed diets consisting of corn and
soybeans, sometimes supplemented with candy to increase animal
weight, the slaughterhouse remains of chickens, pigs, or other cows,
plastic pellets to add the fiber that would be in the natural grass diet,
and even waste material taken from a chicken coop consisting of chicken
feed and manure. The animals can also be dosed with hormones and
47.

Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy and Monopsony, 76
Cornell L. Rev. 297, 313 (1991) (explaining the vulnerability of a seller of a
perishable product); Grimes, supra note 6, at 567–68 (same). See also Todd v.
Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 211 (2d Cir. 2001) (making the related point that
“[l]abor is an extremely perishable commodity—an hour not worked today can
never be recovered” (citation omitted)).

48.

Philip Paarlberg et al., Structural Change and Market Performance in
Agriculture: Critical Issues and Concerns About Concentration in the Pork
Industry 6–7 (Dep’t Agric. Econ. Purdue Univ., Staff Paper No. 14, 1999) (a
marketplace with twenty equally sized pork packers would pay about 5 percent
less than a perfectly competitive marketplace; eight firms would pay 18 percent
less; and four firms would pay 28 percent less).

49.

For example, 80 percent of the beef purchased in the U.S. is sold by the four
largest processors. Andrea Rock, How Safe Is Your Beef?, Consumer Rep.,
Oct. 2015, at 26, 32.

50.

Georgina Gustin, Demand for Grass-Fed Beef is Growing, L.A. Times (Nov.
23, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/23/business/la-fi-grassfed-beef20121123 [https://perma.cc/4RGG-XDEX].

51.

Rock, supra note 49, at 27.

52.

Id. at 31.
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antibiotics to prevent disease and promote growth. 53 In feed lots, they
stand in areas of as little as twenty-three square feet per animal, the
equivalent of a four-foot by six-foot enclosure, with no vegetation, a
great deal of manure, and often lots of mud.54 Life in a feeding station
can be from three months to a year before they are taken to a slaughterhouse.55
These industrial practices are, in a narrow sense, efficient, and at
least some of these savings may be passed on to consumers in the form
of lower prices. Cattle raised in accord with industrial practices can be
brought to slaughter weight as much as a year more quickly than an
animal that stays on a natural, grass-fed diet. The beef from a grassfed animal, with no antibiotics added to its diet, can cost up to $3 more
per pound, a reflection of the longer growth period and greater space
requirements for the grass-fed animal.56 Using industrial methods, more
cattle can be raised with a smaller land and labor footprint, so more
beef can be supplied.
The short-sighted industrial efficiency that prevails in beef
production also governs in poultry. In the United States, the raising of
chickens still is a hands-on job done by hundreds of small entrepreneurs
who contract with a handful of very large chicken processors and distributors. Many find they are indebted to the processors for the costs
of their equipment, are forced to upgrade their facilities at substantial
cost, and—short of bankruptcy—must continue to struggle under oppresssive conditions for themselves and their livestock.57 These
conditions led one economist to compare the chicken farmer’s plight to
economic serfdom.58 At the other end of the chain, factorycommoditized chicken is available in supermarkets at relatively low
prices, but consumer choice and quality is limited.
The efficiencies of raising animals in crowded industrial conditions
are open to question. There is evidence that free range chickens that
can eat bugs, grubs, and worms as part of a natural diet produce smaller
but more nutritious eggs, and that their eggs have thicker shells less

53.

Id. at 30–31.

54.

Id. at 27.

55.

Id. at 30.

56.

Id. at 32.

57.

C. Robert Taylor, ALFA Eminent Scholar Agric. & Pub. Policy, Auburn Univ.,
Comments presented at the Department of Justice & Federal Trade
Commission Joint Workshop on Merger Enforcement 248–49 (Feb. 17, 2004)
(transcript available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2004/
02/ftcdoj-joint-workshop-merger-enforcement [https://perma.cc/ZRV8-Q53P]).

58.

Id. at 216.
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prone to breakage.59 The workers who work with free-range chickens
reportedly have fewer respiratory health issues than those who work in
crowded chicken coops.60 Many of the additional costs to industrial
farming are external costs that are passed on to society, among them
the degradation of antibiotics that are fed to animals and ingested in
small doses each time a consumer eats the meat.61 Other external costs
are the environmental burden on society from the fecal dust and unwelcome odors emanating from feed lots, the burden of disposing of
large amounts of concentrated animal waste, and even the social welfare
benefits that must be paid to some of the contract farmers or their employees because of poverty level income.62
Some farmers have refused to follow industrial farming practices
and raise animals following centuries old animal husbandry practices.
They have an opportunity for success as fast food chains and supermarkets begin to offer alternatives to meat produced through industrial
farming practices. The story, however, does not end here.
The labels “organic,” “natural,” or “free range” have to some degree
been coopted by large meat processors, who still find ways of short
cutting traditional animal husbandry practices and selling their products with such labels. Chickens stuffed into crowded hen houses are
given a small outside area to escape, then are sold as “free range.”63
They are advertised as having no “antibiotics” added to their food, but
cannot eat the natural diet of grubs, bugs, and worms that would
produce eggs with thicker shells and the dark yellow yolks of a
59.

Daphne Miller, Farmacology, What Innovative Family Farming
Can Teach Us About Health and Healing 106–10 (2013).

60.

Id. at 119–20.

61.

A Consumer Reports Study found that while bacteria are found in beef
regardless of how the cattle are raised, there was a notable increase in certain
types of bacteria, including those resistant to antibiotics, in beef from cattle
sent to feedlots. Rock, supra note 49, at 29.

62.

James M. MacDonald & Penni Korb, U.S. Dep’t Agric. Econ. Res.
Serv., Econ. Info. Bull. No. 72, Agricultural Contracting
Update: Contracts in 2008 (Feb. 2011) at 1, 20 (finding that the mean
household income from broiler-only operations amounted to $14,890 in 2008).
Low-paying jobs of all sorts can result in society bearing external costs in the
form of social-welfare benefits. For example, low-paid Wal-Mart workers have
reportedly received state or federal welfare benefits. Abigail Goldman, Study
Cites Social Costs of Wal-Mart, L.A. Times (Aug. 3, 2004), http://articles.
latimes.com/2004/aug/03/business/fi-walmart3 [https://perma.cc/9MJH-PPKZ]
(describing three surveys detailing state or federal assistance received by Wal-Mart
employees).

63.

Michael Pollan, The Omnivore’s Dilemma: A Natural History of
Four Meals 169–73 (2006) (describing a tour of a large chicken-raising facility
that markets eggs as organic and free range).
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traditional free range chicken. These eggs might more accurately be
labeled “industrial organic.”64
These practices border on deceptive. Leaving aside any consumerprotection issue, industrial organic farming makes it more difficult for
a farmer and processor desiring to use traditional husbandry practices.
Retailers that might otherwise be persuaded to carry the farmer’s genuinely organic animal products will be pressured to carry instead the
mass-produced industrial “organics.” These woes are compounded by
federal regulation, which is designed to fit the industrial processor’s
practices. For example, dominant chicken processors slaughter poultry
in a large industrial facility that must meet USDA requirements for impermeable, white washed walls and antiseptic conditions.65 It is difficult
for a small chicken farmer raising chickens under more natural conditions to satisfy these requirements. The regulations do not require
measuring the actual bacterial content of the slaughtered animals,
which would seem the most relevant test.66 A small-volume organic
processor may choose to slaughter the animals in a natural outdoor
facility, which many believe results in the lowest bacteria exposure.
That processor, however, may be out of compliance because it has no
walls to white wash and treat with antiseptic chemicals.67 The genuine
organic farmer or processor risks closure or operation as a rogue
facility.68
These regulatory obstacles are outside the reach of antitrust
authorities. At the same time, timid merger enforcement was complicit
in creating the oligopolistic conditions that surround USDA regulation.
Regulators of meat products respond to the industry, but presumably
do not seek to change its structure or the power distribution within
that industry. Consider how food regulation might differ if a large percentage of meat products—say 20 percent or more—were raised,
slaughtered, and brought to market in accord with more traditional
animal husbandry practices. A less concentrated processing industry
would likely respond more flexibly to consumer demand, offering more
choices. USDA regulation that is now designed for large plant meat
64.

Id.

65.

Id. at 228–29.

66.

Id. at 229.

67.

Id. at 228–30 (describing the difficulties that a small, organic processor of
chickens confronts in complying with USDA regulations).

68.

Some pioneers in organic and naturally raised animals have tried to thread the
regulatory and oligopoly obstacles by establishing direct, farm to table options.
For example, a direct ranch to table distribution system for grass-fed beef was
established by Colorado rancher Mike Callicrate. Protocol, Callicrate
Cattle Co., http://www.callicratecattleco.com/Protocol.htm [https://perma.
cc/P3LX-CKQ4] (last visited Sept. 14, 2017).
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processing would be forced to adjust to consumer demand for organic
farming practices.
The Justice Department, in its 2012 report on competition in
agriculture, acknowledged special monopsony issues in agriculture
mergers.69 That report, however, stopped well short of recognizing the
unique vulnerability of the small producer to monopsony power and the
need for more stringent controls of mergers that increase buying power.
The Cargill case is a classic case of neglect of the buyer-power issue.70
Seen only from a short-term consumer price perspective, further concentration of beef packers may have seemed benign. From the
perspective of cattle ranchers or consumers wishing more choice in how
cattle are raised and slaughtered, the picture is starkly altered. The
merging firms could, by reducing a rancher’s alternatives, place downward pressure on prices paid for cattle. If only a portion of the reduced
costs were passed on to consumers, the oligopolistic beef packers could
expect higher margins and profits.
The Justice Department Report also failed to recognize the
difficulties faced by affected producers who might seek antitrust relief.
Most contract farmers, for example, are afraid to act publicly to
question the actions of the processor on whom they depend. The class
action enforcement vehicle is becoming less viable as the Supreme Court
has made rulings that limit the availability of class action relief. The
Court’s decision in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant71
invites processors to insert no-class-action clauses in their contracts
with farmers to prevent both arbitration and litigation on a class action
basis.72 Changes in substantive law add to these difficulties. The
Supreme Court’s decision in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross Simons
Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc.73 created a heavy burden on any atomistic
seller alleging predatory buying practices.74 These changes in the law
governing private enforcement of the Sherman Act place increased
importance on prophylactic merger enforcement that could lessen the
occurrence of power abuses in agriculture. The question remains

69.

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Competition and Agriculture: Voices from
the Workshops on Agriculture and Antitrust Enforcement in
Our 21st Century Economy and Thoughts on the Way Forward
18–19, 21 (2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2012/
05/16/283291.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VTQ-SBU9].

70.

See supra note 46 and accompanying text.

71.

133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).

72.

Id. at 2309–12.

73.

549 U.S. 312 (2007).

74.

Id. at 318–20.
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whether invigorated enforcement, assuming it were to occur, would be
too late to preserve or restore a competitive market structure.
B. Healthcare

The United States has by far the most expensive healthcare in the
world.75 Even after implementation of the Affordable Care Act, the
system fails to provide healthcare for all of its citizens.76 Measures of
health outcomes also suggest that the United States lags behind most
developed nations. Based on data from the Organisation for Economic
Co-Operation and Development in 2010—gathered before the Affordable Care Act was enacted—the United States had by far the highest
per capita spending on healthcare, drug prices, and cost per hospital
visit of the twelve developed nations gathered. Yet the United States
performed near the middle on case-specific hospital mortality and poorly on hospital admissions for chronic conditions and amputations due
to diabetes.77 Another study showed that, despite vastly higher per
capita expenditures on healthcare, the United States ranked last, by a
wide margin, among thirteen developed nations in averting preventable
deaths—deaths from preventable diseases or complications.78
75.

U.S. expenditure and financing of healthcare represented 17.2 percent of gross
domestic product in 2016, whereas Switzerland—the second highest—was 12.4
percent. Health Expenditure and Financing, Org. for Econ. Co-Operation
& Dev. http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=SHA [https://perma.
cc/5ESE-C87U].

76.

In 2015, 9.1 percent of the US population had no health insurance for any portion
of the year. U.S. Census Bureau, P60-257 (RV), Health Insurance
Coverage in the United States: 2015 3 (2016), https:/
/www.census.gov/library/publications/2016/demo/p60-257.html [https://perma.
cc/W9Y3-A2Z3].

77.

David A. Squires, The U.S. Health System in Perspective: A Comparison of
Twelve Industrialized Nations, Commonwealth Fund: Issues Int’l
Health Pol’y, July 2011, at 1, 2. The same source reports that the U.S.
performed very well for survival rates in cervical, breast, and colorectal cancer.
Other variables affect these comparative statistics. For example, U.S. dietary
habits are likely to have contributed to the poor results for diabetes-related
ailments. On the other hand, wider health insurance coverage could have
improved diabetes outcomes by providing patients with better information and
preventive care. Id. New Zealand, which had the lowest healthcare expenditures
among the twelve nations—barely more than a third of US per capita
expenditures—had similar or superior outcomes for most measures of healthcare
quality. Id. Compared to the U.S., New Zealand had similar five-year survival
rates for cervical cancer but slightly lower survival rates for breast and
colorectal cancer. Id. at 10.

78.

Melissa Etehad & Kyle Kim, The U.S. Spends More on Healthcare Than Any
Other Country—But Not With Better Health Outcomes, L.A. Times (July 18,
2017, 4:25 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-healthcare-comparison20170715-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/7FHL-47WA] (citing a study of the
European
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At the start of the U.S. healthcare supply chain are many atomistic
doctors, therapists, and medical professionals. At the other end are
consumers. In the middle, however, are some highly concentrated oligopolies playing key roles, including hospitals, health insurers, drug
manufacturers, retail pharmacies, and prescription benefit managers.
Further complications are presented by the patent system covering new
drugs—a system of health insurance that dulls patient incentives to
bargain for quality care at the best price—the difficulty consumers have
in rating the quality of medical service and treatments, and the complex
regulatory overlay.
Although the enforcement agencies have been proactive in recent
years in challenging mergers that would result in further consolidation
by hospitals, insurers, prescription management firms, and pharmaceutical manufacturers,79 their efforts may be too little too late.80 In
some instances, well-grounded challenges to mergers have met resistance in the courts.81 In other instances, the agencies failed to challenge
Observatory on Health Systems and Policy). The study showed that for 2013, the
U.S. had 112 preventable deaths per 100,000. Among the other twelve developed
nations, the preventable deaths ranged from fifty-five to eighty-five. Id.
79.

FTC & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Hart-Scott-Rodino Annual Report: Fiscal Year 2015,
at 1, 15–18, 20–22, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federaltrade-commission-bureau-competition-department-justice-antitrust-division-hartscott-rodino/160801hsrreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/CB4S-DJNB] (showing that
of the twenty-two FTC merger challenges, eleven involved healthcare industry
mergers). In 2017, the Justice Department was successful in blocking two major
health insurance mergers: Anthem’s attempt to combine with Cigna, Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, D.C. Circuit Affirms Decision Blocking Anthem’s
Acquisition of Cigna (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/dccircuit-affirms-decision-blocking-anthem-s-acquisition-cigna [https://perma.cc/
GL69-DTTJ], and Aetna’s attempt to combine with Humana, United States v.
Aetna Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2017).

80.

A number of critics conclude that high hospital prices are linked to lessened
competition in local hospital markets. Zack Cooper et al., The Price Ain’t
Right? Hospital Prices and Health Spending on the Privately Insured 34
(December 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Case Western
Reserve Law Review); Leemore Dafny et al., The Price Effects of Cross-Market
Hospital Mergers 29 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
22106, 2017); Tim Xu et al., The Potential Hazards of Hospital Consolidation:
Implications for Quality, Access, and Price, 314 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 1337,
1338 (2015).

81.

The enforcement failures of the 1990s include FTC v. Tenet Heathcare Corp., 186
F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999); FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated
as moot, 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997); FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F.
Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996), aff’d, 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997). More recently,
the FTC failed in two district court rulings but succeeded on appeal in obtaining
preliminary injunctions halting proposed hospital mergers. FTC v. Penn State
Hershey Med. Ctr., 185 F. Supp. 3d 552 (M.D. Pa. 2016), rev’d, 838 F.3d 327 (3d
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mergers that resulted in price increases. In his review of retrospective
studies of mergers, John Kwoka concluded that price increases from
hospital mergers, along with mergers involving journals and airlines,
were likely to involve the highest increases in prices.82 Price increases
to consumers, however, are likely only one of the anticompetitive effects
of concentration in the mid-levels of the distribution chain. Choices and
effects on quality of care, although more difficult to quantify, are
likely.83
There are substantial advantages to being a solo-practicing
physician. One can maintain control over treatment of individual
patients, avoiding the “turnstile” medicine associated with corporate
practice. To maximize revenues, a corporate practice may favor more
profitable treatments over equally or more effective ones or it may require a patient to return for separate visits to deal with multiple
diagnosed problems.84 A solo-practicing physician can place patient interest above financial gain and treat all problems in a single visit. Even
with this financial sacrifice, at least for some specialists, monetary
incentives still favor a doctor’s solo practice. One Southern California
allergist estimated that a solo-practicing doctor in his line, once the
practice was established, could easily earn two or three times more than
a salaried colleague in corporate practice.85
Despite these substantial advantages to solo practice, most young
doctors do not choose this option.86 Consider the motivated medical
Cir. 2016); FTC v. Advocate Health Care Network, No. 15 C 11473, 2016 WL
3387163 (N.D. Ill. 2016), rev’d, 841 F.3d 460 (7th Cir. 2016).
82.

John E. Kwoka, Mergers, Merger Control, and Remedies: A
Retrospective Analysis of U.S. Policy 154–55 (2015).

83.

Tim Xu et al., supra note 80, at 1337–38.

84.

Current Medicare payment practices invite this multiple visit scheme. The
author is grateful for information provided by interviews with solo-practicing
physicians for this insight. See also Tamara B. Hayford, The Impact of Hospital
Mergers on Treatment Intensity and Health Outcomes, 47 Health Servs.
Res. 1008, 1026 (2012) (finding that “hospital mergers are associated with
greater treatment intensity, both in the type of treatment utilized and in the
number of procedures [patients] received during a hospital stay,” and “increased
utilization of intensive surgeries”).

85.

The author is grateful to a solo-practicing Southern California allergist for these
insights. Notes of the interview are on file with the author.

86.

“The share of solo practices” for family physicians “fell to 18 percent in 2008 from
44 percent in 1986.” Gardiner Harris, Family Physician Can’t Give Away Solo
Practice, N.Y. Times, (April 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/04/23/health/23doctor.html [https://perma.cc/Y4QC-U5TF]. Despite this
downturn, the American Academy of Family Physicians still maintains a link on
its website specifically designed to assist the solo practitioner or small group
practice. American Academy of Family Physicians, http://www.aafp.
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school graduate who might prefer to start her own practice. Because of
large debt coming out of medical school, she is reluctant to incur an
even greater debt required to carry her through the cash-strapped
startup years. Banks, recognizing the new realities of private practice,
may be reluctant to lend a young doctor the needed startup funds.87
The lure of an immediate salary from an HMO or corporate practice,
despite its relatively modest amount, is substantial. The control
exercised by oligopsonistic health insurance companies and large hospitals increases the risks of going the private-practice route. Health
insurance companies “own” the patient. If the solo-practicing physician
is unwilling to accept the payment rate offered by the insurer, the
patient will often switch to a different doctor. Meanwhile, the doctor
has no leverage to negotiate with the insurer;88 the insurer presents the
payment package to the doctor on a “take it or leave it” basis.
Consumer choice, entry, quality of service, and quality of life all can be
adversely affected.
Depending on a doctor’s specialty, access to a hospital can be an
issue for a solo-practicing physician. The doctor may have some leverage if there is competition among competing hospitals. That leverage
quickly dissipates when oligopolistic conditions develop among local
hospitals.89 To avoid the pitfalls of exclusion or take-it-or-leave-it terms
from power-wielding hospitals, the physician is once again pushed away
from solo practice and toward a corporate or large group practice.
The point is not that small or solo-practicing physicians always
perform better than large group or hospital practices. Indeed, the ranks
of small practice doctors include their share of incompetent physicians,
or even some who engage in fraud. Some family physicians believe that
they can perform better when a group practice lightens their load of
patients and gives them better access to peer guidance.90 But small
practices also include some top performing doctors who prefer to
operate independently and who have loyal patients who prefer the small
practice setting. Choice should be preserved for both practicing physicians and for their patients.
org/practice-management/administration/central.html [https://perma.cc/526Y3X7X] (last visited Sept. 21, 2017).
87.

Harris, supra note 86 (noting that even if young doctors want to start a private
practice, “banks—attuned to the growing uncertainties—are far less likely to
lend the money needed.”).

88.

Id. (“[L]arge group practices can negotiate higher fees from insurers . . . .”).

89.

See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). Hyde
was a solo-practicing anesthesiologist who was excluded from the hospital when
the hospital contracted exclusively with a group-practicing firm. Id. at 5.

90.

See Harris, supra note 86 (quoting a family practitioner who left a two-person
practice for a government job).

82

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 1·2017
Restoring a Relevant Antitrust Policy

If the United States is committed to a competitive healthcare
economy, eliminating oligopsonistic conditions in industries such as
health insurance and hospitals is vital. Unless these concerns are
addressed, the young medical school graduate will have strong disincentives to starting her own practice. Her life style preference is
thwarted, a loss in and of itself, but one that is directly connected to
performance and the quality of the services that she will provide to
patients. In Canada, where a single payer system is in effect, a
substantially larger percentage of physicians are in solo or small practices,91 an indication that many doctors prefer this mode of practice
when the system does not deter it.
Healthcare antitrust guidelines adopted by the federal antitrust
agencies have operated as a perverse incentive for doctors to affiliate.
Responding to pressure of large insurance companies and hospitals,
doctors have sought, without the protection of the labor laws, to form
cooperative groups to negotiate reimbursement rates. The Healthcare
Guidelines seek to address this form of cooperative rate negotiation,92
but do so by encouraging affiliations and cooperative arrangements
thought to make medical practice more efficient. The underlying
premise of these regulations is that price fixing, or joint rate
negotiation, should be permitted only when there are offsetting
efficiencies derived from integration of physician practice.93 However
well intended, the guidelines operate as a regulatory scheme to
encourage integration or consolidation of medical practices and a disincentive to solo-practicing or small practice physicians.
On more than a few occasions, antitrust has thwarted oppressed
sellers’ collective efforts to protect their interests. Most individual
entrepreneurs or small businesses are not protected by labor law exemptions, so collective action as a response to oligopsony power has
been attacked as an unlawful antitrust conspiracy.94 The case law
91.

Compare National Physician Survey, 2004, Nat’l Physician Surv., http://
nationalphysiciansurvey.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2012/10/NPS2004-National-byProv-Binder.pdf [https://perma.cc/SR7G-VB4J] (last visited Sept. 12, 2017)
(finding that in Canada in 2004, 32 percent of physicians were in solo practice
and 54 percent were in group practice), with Harris, supra note 86 (finding that
as of 2008, in the U.S. only 18 percent of family practitioners were in solo
practice).

92.

Dep’t of Justice & FTC, Statements of Antitrust Enforcement
Policy in Health Care 43 (Aug. 1996).

93.

Id. at 71–73.

94.

See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 431–32 (1990)
(holding that the association of court appointed lawyers who represented indigent
defendants violated the Sherman Act and the FTC Act by engaging in collective
boycott in a wage dispute); Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332,
348–49 (1982) (holding that doctors who collectively set insurance reimbursement
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suggests the Supreme Court has been somewhat more forgiving when
buyers engage in collective action.95 The Justice Department’s Healthcare Guidelines seem an apt example of the disfavored treatment of
collective actions by sellers.
To be sure, there can be benefits from integration of medical
practices, including a sharing of patient records or the development of
sound treatment protocols. Treatment protocols, however, can force
physicians to comply with a regimen that is profitable but not
necessarily effective or cost efficient. In some cases, these protocols may
perversely undermine treatment in areas where experimentation may
be legitimate and where medical science has not reached a clear consensus. In other cases, the coordination may result in doctors choosing a
form of treatment that is more profitable for the practice but less
advantageous for the patient.96 For example, a policy that encourages
or requires participating doctors to use expensive treatments when
equally or more effective treatments are available, or refuses to allow a
doctor to deal with more than one health condition during a single visit.
Other benefits from an integrated practice might be achieved in
ways that do not penalize the small practice. For example, sharing of
patients’ records can be efficient and advantageous to both the doctor
and patient. But record sharing should not be confined to the limits of
an integrated practice. A better solution might facilitate universal
sharing of records among all medical professionals, regardless of their
affiliation with a particular practice.
The Guidelines were not intended to discriminate against small
medical practices. Unfortunately, that is one of their effects. In seeking
a solution for the inequality of bargaining between doctors, on the one
fees for various medical procedures committed a per se violation of the Sherman
Act).
95.

See, e.g., Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472
U.S. 284, 298 (1985); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610–
11 (1972) (holding that the joint purchasing and marketing arrangement
violated Section 1, not because of efficient purchasing, but because of the
territorial exclusivity accorded to member stores); Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 22–24 (1945) (holding that the joint procurement of news
stories alone was not a violation of antitrust laws, but stringent entry rules were
a violation). For additional analysis for the harsher treatment of joint selling
when compared with joint purchasing, see Warren S. Grimes, The Sherman
Act’s Unintended Bias Against Lilliputians: Small Players’ Collective Action as
a Counter to Relational Market Power, 69 Antitrust L.J. 195, 216–25 (2001);
Masterman, supra note 6, at 1409–13.

96.

See supra note 84 and accompanying text; Chad Terhune, Americans Waste
$200 Billion Every Year on Medical Tests They Don’t Need, Experts Say, L.A.
Times (May 25, 2017, 7:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fimedical-tests-20170526-story.html [https://perma.cc/VXX2-L5R8] (“Some
experts estimate that at least $200 billion is wasted annually on excessive
testing and treatment.”).
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hand, and oligopsonistic insurance providers and hospitals, on the other
hand, the agencies have crafted a toxic and very much regulatory
scheme that favors integrated medical practices over small group or solo
practicing physicians. The Guidelines do not directly address the
underlying problem that gave rise to doctor cooperative schemes: the
increasing level of concentration among health insurers and hospitals
with which doctors must deal.
The problems confronting the delivery of healthcare go well beyond
merger policy. Still, core problems, such as concentration in ownership
of hospitals and health insurance firms, can be traced to past failures
in merger enforcement. Future merger policy, by lessening oligopsonistic dominance in the middle of the distribution chain, must be part
of the solution. The choice to be a solo practitioner should be preserved
for those doctors who prefer this way of practicing and patients who
prefer this way of receiving medical care.
C. Communications and Entertainment

The digital age has fundamentally changed lives. The digital world
is a central part of how people communicate, gather and share
information, and find videos and other forms of entertainment. The
digital communications business has fallen largely into the hands of
large and oligopolistic firms, subject to considerable government
regulation. Still, where competition reigns, there is less need for
regulation. The cell phone industry is an example. Large firms dominate
this industry, but there is sufficient competition and dynamism to provide consumers with meaningful service choices without heavy handed
government regulation.97
In other sectors of communication, competition has been lacking.98
High speed internet connections, for many consumers, are unavailable,99
or can be obtained only from a single provider. Subscription cable TV—
although competitively threatened by video streaming through the

97.

Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Files Antitrust Lawsuit to
Block AT&T’s Acquisition of T-Mobile (Aug. 31, 2011), https://www.justice.
gov/opa/pr/justice-department-files-antitrust-lawsuit-block-att-s-acquisition-tmobile [https://perma.cc/L75D-D5QS] (calling T-Mobile “an important source
of competition among the national carriers, including through innovation and
quality enhancements”).

98.

See Susan Crawford, Captive Audience: The Telecom Industry and
Monopoly Power in the New Gilded Age 9–10 (2013) (describing the
monopoly risks arising from control of the internet pipeline by large, vertically
integrated firms).

99.

According to the FCC, 10 percent of all Americans lack access to 25 Mbps/3
Mbps service. FCC, 2016 Broadband Progress Report, 31 FCC Rcd. 699, 731
(2016).
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internet—continues to force consumers to purchase high-priced bundles
containing mostly channels that they will never watch.100
There is creative atomism at the start of the entertainment
distribution chain: authors, composers, artists, script writers, musicians, actors, and athletes develop and nurture their own skills.101
Although some work for large corporations, many remain tenaciously
independent. A major issue for these creators is their ability to get
programming to the public. To do so requires negotiating the hurdles
of vertically integrated firms that control distribution and favor their
own content or demand discriminatory ransom.102 The owners of
independent channels, such as Wealth TV, have publicly complained of
difficulties in obtaining distribution.103
Although some may view merger enforcement as vigorous under the
Obama Administration, its record with respect to communications was
spotty. The Justice Department and the Federal Communications
Commission (“FCC”) prevented AT&T’s proposed acquisition of TMobile, thereby preserving a maverick competitor,104 and also thwarted
Comcast’s proposed acquisition of Time Warner Cable.105 On the other
hand, the agencies allowed, subject to conditions, Comcast’s acquisition

100. See Warren S. Grimes, The Distribution of Pay Television in the United States:
Let an Unshackled Marketplace Decide, 5 J. Int’l. Media & Ent. L. 1, 3–4
(2013).
101. See supra Part II.B.
102. A 2007 study commissioned by the FCC found evidence that cable distributors
are more likely to carry their own channels than those of rivals except in areas
where there is adequate competition from satellite distributors. Austan
Goolsbee, Vertical Integration and the Market for Broadcast
and Cable Television Programming 31 (2007). The study also found a
lack of evidence of efficiencies in vertical integration of program providers and
distributors. Id.
103. FCC, Fourteenth Report, 27 FCC Rcd. 8610, 8635 (2012). See also David
Lazarus, Give Cable TV Subscribers More Freedom of Choice, L.A. Times
(May 7, 2013), https:// http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/07/business/lafi-lazarus-20130507 [https://perma.cc/GXF8-T38S] (stating the complaints of
the Chief Operating Officer of Ovation TV, whose arts and entertainment
channel had been dropped by distributor Time Warner Cable).
104. See Press Release, supra note 97.
105. Press Release, Dep’t. of Justice, Comcast Corp. Abandons Proposed Acquisition
of Time Warner Cable After Justice Dep’t and the FCC Informed Parties of
Concerns (Apr. 24, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/comcast-corporation
-abandons-proposed-acquisition-time-warner-cable-after-justice-department
[https://perma.cc/LD9R-XPTV].
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of NBC Universal,106 AT&T’s acquisition of Direct TV,107 and Charter’s
acquisition of Time Warner Cable.108 Despite well-intended conditions
imposed on these transactions, the overall impact of these consolidations was increased oligopoly power in the distribution chain.109
Comcast’s acquisition of NBC Universal resulted in vertical
integration of the country’s largest cable and Internet provider with
one of the largest video content providers. Despite minimal horizontal
issues in this merger, the combination has contributed to actual and
potential strategic conduct that makes it more difficult for small
content providers to get their video programming to consumers.110
Competition would be best served if all distributors of video programming, whether by cable subscription or internet streaming, were
not vertically integrated into content supply. The fear that large
distributors were not sufficiently neutral was the major impetus for net
neutrality regulation.111 Comprehensive regulation might not be required if Comcast and other distributors had no conflict of interest in
deciding which programming to carry. Competition is a more efficient
106. Press Release, Dep’t. of Justice, Justice Dep’t Allows Comcast-NBCU Joint
Venture to Proceed with Conditions (Jan. 18, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/justice-department-allows-comcast-nbcu-joint-venture-proceed-conditions
[https://perma.cc/WQ3S-BFT9].
107. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Dep’t Will Not Challenge AT&T’s
Acquisition of DirecTV (July 21, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justicedepartment-will-not-challenge-atts-acquisition-directv [https://perma.cc/92MWE2CE].
108. Proposed Final Judgment at 5–6, United States v. Charter Commc’n, Inc., No. 16cv-00759 (D. D.C. Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/844851/
download [https://perma.cc/M2JV-ST7S] (permitting the merger but imposing
certain restrictions on making video programming available to Internet providers).
109. Professor Kwoka’s conclusion that non-divestiture remedies were notably
ineffective in preventing price increases offers one reason for concern with these
outcomes. Kwoka, supra note 82, at 156 (“Conduct remedies result in price
increases of 12.81 percent, suggesting that these are largely ineffective in
restraining postmerger price increases.”).
110. See, e.g., Ryan Hatch, Yankees’ Opening Day: YES Network, Comcast Dispute
Rages On, NJ (Apr. 3, 2016), http://www.nj.com/yankees/index.ssf/2016/
04/yes_network_comcast_dispute_rages_as_yankees_open.html [https://
perma.cc/DWP9-CDB2].
111. Proponents of Internet openness “fear that broadband providers might prevent
their end-user subscribers from accessing certain edge providers altogether, or
might degrade the quality of their end-user subscribers’ access to certain edge
providers, either as a means of favoring their own competing content or services
or to enable them to collect fees from certain edge providers.” U.S. Telecom
Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 690 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing Verizon v. FCC, 740
F.3d 623, 629 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). See generally Restoring Internet Freedom,
FCC, www.fcc.gov/general/open-internet [https://perma.cc/U5AQ-CH6V]
(explaining the FCC’s ideas on the principle of “Open Internet”).
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and less onerous way to ensure that telecommunications firms serve the
public interest, but competition can work only if mergers undermining
a competitive structure are blocked.
In November 2017, the Justice Department filed suit to challenge
AT&T’s proposed acquisition of Time Warner.112 The vertical issues
posed by this transaction are very similar to those addressed in
Comcast’s 2011 acquisition of NBC Universal. This time around, the
Antitrust Division—not satisfied with conduct remedies—insisted on a
divestiture as a condition for permitting the transaction, and is now in
litigation with AT&T. The outcome of this case is uncertain, but the
more aggressive effort to oppose vertical integration is amply justified
by the record of abuses in this industry.
AT&T and Direct TV were direct competitors in areas of the
country served by AT&T’s U-verse fiber-optic cable. In allowing their
merger, the Justice Department and FCC imposed as a condition that
AT&T commit to extending its system of fiber-optic cable, thereby
providing high-speed Internet access, or at least a choice in obtaining
that access, to more U.S. consumers.113 Obtaining more competition and
choices in high-speed Internet access is a critical policy goal. Even if
the FCC might reasonably trade more internet access for a reduction
in competition in providing cable or satellite TV, one wonders whether
this is a legitimate interpretation of the Clayton Act, which prohibits
acquisitions which may reduce competition in “any market” and does
not authorize trading competition in one market for another.114
Statutory interpretation aside, AT&T’s commitment to expand its
fiber-optic network will be difficult to enforce and, by itself, likely will
not lead to meaningful competition in high-speed Internet access. If the
firm drags its feet in building out its network, there may be little in the
way of sanctions that the FCC or the Antitrust Division can impose.
This sort of regulatory decree is at odds with the principle that the
preferred remedy is structural and with the preference for fixing the
problem before the acquisition proceeds.115 Moreover, even if the fiber
112. Complaint, United States v. AT&T, No. 1:17-cv-02511 (D. D.C. Nov. 20, 2017).
113. AT&T Inc., 30 FCC Rcd. 9131, 9278 (2015).
114. Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012) (stating that “[n]o person engaged
in commerce . . . shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the
stock or other share capital . . . where in any line of commerce or in any activity
affecting commerce . . . , the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly” but creating no exception
for uncertain benefits in a different industry).	
  
115. The Antitrust Division does not require that a merger remedy involve fixing the
underlying competitive problem before the merger proceeds, but notes that “[a]
fix-it-first remedy eliminates the Division’s antitrust concerns and therefore the
need to file a case.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Division Policy
Guide to Merger Remedies 26 (2004).
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network is completed, it will in many markets simply result in a
duopoly. AT&T will have a strong incentive to price-in parallel to its
rival. Meaningful choice and meaningful price competition seem a pipe
dream.116 A more comprehensive solution to providing affordable and
high-quality high-speed Internet may require across the board regulatory or legislative relief. Meanwhile, the enforcers have given up
competition in the subscription cable TV market for highly uncertain
benefits in internet access.
Another content-stifling feature of video programming is the
cumbersome bundles that are imposed on cable TV subscribers. These
bundling practices are yet another example of mid-stream power,
wielded at the expense of both creators at the beginning of the
distribution chain and consumers at the end. The power is with
oligopolistic content firms that require distributors to carry large
bundles of their channels in the basic distribution tier, preventing distributors from offering a la carte choices. The coercive nature of the
power these firms exercise over subscribers is reflected in a comment of
a television executive who declared that customers would “give up food
and a roof over their head before they give up TV.”117 Concentration at
both content and distribution levels makes it more difficult for an
innovative maverick to offer consumers more choices.
The Antitrust Division has substantial expertise and interest in
competition in telecommunications services. The address by former
Assistant Attorney General Bill Baer, focusing on the need for
competition and neutrality among internet pipeline providers, was
helpful.118 But more is needed. The goal of achieving clarity and
certainty would be fostered by policy statements addressing telecommunications mergers and other related competition issues. Levels of
116. Under President Obama, the FCC sought to encourage local communities to
build their own high-speed networks, even beyond the borders of their
municipality, taking the position that state legislation obtained by incumbent
monopolists to block such development is preempted by the FCC’s statutory
authority. Incumbent internet service providers, who did not relish the
competition, successfully challenged the FCC in court. See Press Release, FCC,
Chairman Wheeler Statement on Municipal Broadband Court Decision (Aug.
10, 2016), http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2016/
db0810/DOC-340738A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/LM9P-X7NA].
117. Meg James, Fox’s Chase Carey Calls a la Carte Programming ‘a Fantasy’, L.A.
Times (Aug. 8, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/08/entertainment/
la-et-ct-foxs-chase-carey-calls-ala-carte-a-fantasy-20130808 [https://perma.cc/
6LJ7-38JS]. A younger generation of cord cutters or never corders put pressure on
cable TV distributors and programmers to offer more choices. The anticompetitive
bundling practices of the industry, however, have endured for decades and may
continue for many more years. See Grimes, supra note 100.
118. See Bill Baer, Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Video Competition:
Opportunities and Challenges 6–8 (Oct. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/file/782401/download [https://perma.cc/F2S8-CL25].
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concentration that may be tolerable in some industries are objectionable
in a service and creative component industry so vital to consumers.
Vertical integration that may be relatively unproblematic in some
industries is likely to be troublesome when providers of popular content
wield such leverage over distributors.

IV. Why Small Firms Thrive in the Beer & Wine
Industries
A relatively open distribution system can be critical for new entry
and entrepreneurial choice. The beer and wine industries provide a
compelling example. Both of these industries involve a creative component and winemakers, like farmers, are often growers. Small craft
brewers and winemakers have enjoyed a strong resurgence. Antitrust
enforcement, however, may have had little to do with protecting the
opportunities of new entrants in these industries.
During the populist enforcement era of the 1960s, the Justice
Department was aggressive in challenging beer mergers, among them
an acquisition that would have created the nation’s fifth largest brewer
with 4.49 percent of the national market.119 The Government, successful
in the Supreme Court, argued that in Wisconsin, the merger would have
created the largest brewer with 24 percent of the market.120 This state
market was harshly criticized as gerrymandered and inconsistent with
market realities.121 Attention to concentration at the state level was
consistent with state regulatory control and might have created a more
favorable distribution platform for the subsequent emergence of craft
brewing, but that was not to be. As merger enforcement standards were
relaxed, multiple mergers produced today’s highly concentrated beer
industry. Two firms, Anheuser-Busch InBev and Miller Coors, had 70
percent of the beer sales in the United States as of 2016.122
Notwithstanding relaxed merger policies that produced a tight
oligopoly, the craft beer revolution was enabled by strict state control
over vertical integration. The 21st Amendment to the Constitution
119. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 550 (1966).
120. Id.
121. Kenneth G. Elzinga & Thomas F. Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market
Delineation in Antimerger Suits, 18 Antitrust Bull. 45, 81 (1973).
122. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Dep’t Requires Anheuser-Busch InBev to
Divest Stake in MillerCoors and Alter Beer Distrib. Practices as Part of
SABMiller Acquisition (July 20, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justicedepartment-requires-anheuser-busch-inbev-divest-stake-millercoors-and-alterbeer [https://perma.cc/2JK3-WJAQ]. Molson, as a result of the divestiture
required by the Antitrust Division, is the majority stakeholder of all of Miller’s
US operations. Id.
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repealed prohibition and gave each state control over the production
and sale of alcoholic beverages.123 At that time, many states adopted a
mandatory three-tier system, prohibiting vertical integration of producers, distributors, and retailers.124 Maintaining independently owned
distributors makes it more difficult for powerful producers to lock up
distribution. There may be other advantages that explain the growth
and survival of small producers, but the open availability of distribution
channels is an important part of this story. While distribution was not
open in all states, the three-tier system was sufficiently rooted to enable
the craft beer resurgence over the past two decades.
Small and regional breweries—called microbreweries—now control
roughly 14 percent of the U.S. market by volume.125 Unlike farmers or
ranchers, microbrewers typically do not grow or raise their own ingredients, but exercise their craft as processors. To have a chance to
distribute efficiently, such brewers require access to effective distribution, particularly when a brewer hopes to reach a market beyond its
home state.126 Even in states in which dominant brewers cannot own

123. U.S. Const. amend. XXI.
124. The ABInBev/SABMiller Merger and the State of Competition in the Beer
Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy and
Consumer Rights, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 1, 3 (2015)
(statement of Bob Pease, Chief Executive Officer, Brewers Association) (noting
that ABInBev owns wholesalers in California, Colorado, Hawaii, Massachusetts,
New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Washington). Only fifteen states allow
beer producers to own distributorships. Id. at 2.
125. Stephen Wilmot, Craft Beer Slowdown Is No Help to Big Brewers, Wall St. J.
(Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-craft-brewing-slowdownwont-benefit-big-beer-1472187785 [https://perma.cc/UUA2-88ZT] (reporting
that craft brewers continue to grow but at a slower rate). At the beginning of
1980, there were about ten microbreweries, but by 2016, there were 3,132.
Victor J. Tremblay & Carol Horton Tremblay, The U.S. Brewing
Industry: Data and Economic Analysis 103 (2005); Number of Breweries,
Brewers Ass’n, https://www.brewersassociation.org/statistics/number-ofbreweries/ [https://perma.cc/6UB8-WEVJ] (last visited Sept. 12, 2017).
126. The repeal of prohibition gave states the authority to regulate the production and
sale of alcoholic beverages. U.S. Const. amend. XXI. Many states responded
with laws that prohibited a brewer from owning its own distributor. See, e.g.,
Heather Morton, Three-Tier Cheers!, St. Legislatures Mag. (June 2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/three-tier-cheers635689375.aspx [https://perma.cc/P8UB-SEA3] (explaining that states have
strengthened laws to keep distributors independent from producers); Andrew Gill,
Craft Brewers Win Small Victory in Springfield, but the Real Winners are
Distributors, WBEZ News (June 4, 2013), http://www.wbez.org/news/
culture/craft-brewers-win-small-victory-springfield-real-winners-are-distributors107514 [https://perma.cc/CFG7-VB9R] (explaining that in Springfield, IL,
“brewers were prohibited from owning any interest in beer or liquor distributors”).
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distributors, a dominant brewer may pressure independent distributors
to exclude or disfavor smaller rival brewers.
In permitting Anheuser Busch InBev’s acquisition of Miller
Brewing, the Antitrust Division imposed a divestiture remedy to
address horizontal concentration and a conduct remedy designed to
protect microbrewers’ access to independent beer distributors.127 The
decree prohibits Anheuser Busch from engaging in certain loyalty or
discount programs that discourage independent beer distributors from
doing business with other brewers and requires Anheuser Busch not to
acquire other brewers or distributors without allowing for advance review by the Antitrust Division.128 The sensitivity the Division showed
to distribution issues affecting microbrewers was constructive but insufficient.129 Whether the conduct remedy will be effective in preventing
the large firm’s future exclusionary treatment punishing smaller rivals
is an open question.130
The real lesson from the Anheuser Busch/Miller acquisition may be
a failure in past merger enforcement. Consider an industry in which,
instead of a 70 percent dominance by two firms, there are eight firms
that share roughly 80 percent of the U.S. market. In such an industry,
issues of vertical integration are far less troublesome. If one or more of
these eight firms decided to acquire its own distributors, there is much
less risk that the firm would use its control of a distributor strategically
to injure a microbrewer. To the contrary, with a share of 20 percent or
less of the market, the firm is more likely to reach out to other brewers
to offer them distribution, in this manner profiting from a greater share
in the distribution market. Under these more competitive conditions,
the market is more likely to self-regulate, and do so in a more effective
manner than through merger conditions imposed on a powerful
oligopolist.
The wine industry in the United States also benefits from the
independent distribution system that grew out of the 21st Amendment.
The largest three wine firms control roughly 46 percent of the US
market,131 but the industry is relatively unconcentrated, with at least

127. See Press Release, supra note 122.
128. Id.
129. Given the problems in maintaining open distribution, the Department would
have been justified in prohibiting Anheuser Busch/Miller from acquiring any
craft brewer for a substantial period of years.
130. Kwoka found conduct remedies were largely ineffective in preventing price
increases by the merged firm. Kwoka, supra note 82, at 156.
131. Rob McMillan, State of Industry Wine Report 2016 42 (2016).
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one winery in each of the fifty states132 and a steady growth in the
number of firms—an average increase of 7 percent per year in the ten
years ending in 2012.133 While large firms dominate the low-price
market, small and boutique firms have a large presence in the mid- and
high-priced categories.134
Entry barriers are said to be high for the lower priced segment of
the market because of the large investment needed in plant, equipment,
vineyards, and advertising.135 But a much smaller investment can get a
new winemaker into the mid or high-priced wine market.136 While some
smaller wine makers sell their wine directly to retailers or end consumers, 90 percent of all wine flows through distributors.137 The largest
twenty distributors have 75 percent of the market, with several hundred
smaller distributors sharing the remainder.138
Although price competition seems to discipline the low-end market,
for mid- and high-price segments, conditions of monopolistic competition prevail: each distinctive brand enjoys substantial pricing
freedom.139 These conditions complement the availability of independent distributors and make it possible for new entrants to succeed and
consumers to choose among an increasing number of local brands. These
benefits will continue as long as merger policy, and antitrust
enforcement more generally, preserves the availability of independent
distribution for small wineries.
The beer and wine industries are examples of creative mid-level
processing that can be efficiently performed by individual entrepreneurs
or small firms. What is needed is lower thresholds for horizontal
concentration among processors. To the extent that these thresholds
have already been exceeded, strict rules on vertical integration are
required to maintain open entry for small processors.

V. The Way Forward
Stacy Mitchell describes a small, dedicated North Dakota
pharmacist who operates a pharmacy serving a town with 500 residents.
132. James Thornton, American Wine Economics: An Exploration of
the U.S. Wine Industry 2 (2013).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 3.
135. Id. at 3–4.
136. Don Cyr et al., The Changing Size Distribution of California’s North Coast
Wineries, 9 J. Wine Econ. 51, 60 (2014).
137. Thornton, supra note 132, at 3.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 185–86.
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To reach a larger customer base, the pharmacist opened a telepharmacy
ten miles down the road, making the drive once or twice a day to deliver
prescriptions.140 The return on this sort of business model is unlikely to
attract large chain pharmacies, but this entrepreneur may have been
assisted by a 1960s North Dakota law that limits pharmacy ownership
to those who are licensed pharmacists.141 Conventional antitrust wisdom
would condemn this law as protectionist: it would seem to protect
inefficient small pharmacies from competition by large pharmacy chains
that operate in most of the rest of the country. But the North Dakota
law apparently has had a pro-competitive effect. Mitchell cites evidence
that North Dakota has lower prescription drug prices than its neighbor
South Dakota, where chain pharmacies are allowed, and most of the
rest of the United States.142
A credible explanation for this result is that, in most of the country,
the majority of retail pharmacies are owned by a few large chains that,
rather than compete on price, are tacitly following oligopolistic pricing
policies that enhance their profits. North Dakota, it turns out, may be
the beneficiary of apparently protectionist legislation that has prevented its pharmacies from falling into the hands of large oligopolists. In
this manner, it has preserved competition among the many diverse
pharmacy owners.
The North Dakota story is consistent with the central theme
explored here. Preserving entrepreneurial choice, particularly important
for industries in which small entrepreneurs are suited, serves a number
of fundamental antitrust goals: (1) preserving efficiency; (2) preserving
small players who are central to innovation; (3) improving the quality
of life for both those who sell and those who buy; and (4) protecting
democratic values by diversifying wealth and power.
The protectionist features of the North Dakota law do not rest
comfortably with competition law. That state’s experience, however,
highlights the inadequacies of a merger control policy that allows
mergers to tight oligopoly. In particular, enforcement policies and court
cases have given insufficient attention to oligopsony abuses that discriminate against small businesses or sole providers. The problem is
acute in industries suited to small entrepreneurship, including those in
which owner operation is a key advantage and those with a strong service or creative component. Such industries include, but are not limited
to, agriculture, healthcare, and communications and entertainment.
To protect entrepreneurial choice for these industries, enforcement
agencies must implement tightened horizontal merger thresholds. Concentration should be measured in geographic markets in which the small
140. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 498–99.
141. Id. at 499.
142. Id. (noting that North Dakota, over a recent five-year period, had lower drug
prices than South Dakota and the 13th lowest prices among the 50 states).
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business can reasonably market its product or service. In industries in
which horizontal concentration is already high, enforcers must act
assertively to prevent vertical combinations that provide both incentive
and opportunity for exclusionary conduct by the vertically integrated
firm. Where large vertically integrated firms already exist, vigorous enforcement against exclusionary vertical practices will help to preserve
entrepreneurial choice. Antitrust should shun regulatory or enforcement
decisions that punish reasonable collective responses of small players
who confront oppressive monopsony power.
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